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Sprouts of Democracy in Chinese History 
 
Pierre-Étienne WILL 
 
 In this article derived from a conference given at Columbia University in 2008, 
Pierre-Etienne Will discards culturalist arguments justifying the absence of a 
democratic regime in China and searches for “sprouts of democracy” in Chinese history. 
 
 As a historian of China, it seems impossible to me not to be concerned with present-day 
politics in that country. Indeed, it is as a historian that I try in this article to look into the 
question of democracy in China; and it is for the same reason that I will abstain from 
discussing the likelihood—or absence of likelihood—of a democratic transition in today’s 
China, of whatever sort: this is a topic for political scientists. 
 
 The immediate motives for my interest in “China and democracy” need not be detailed 
here, except perhaps that I have long been exasperated with a relentless kind of discourse in 
China and in the West, which in effect denies the Chinese the very possibility of converting 
anytime soon to a different political system—a system that would allow for changes in 
political leadership resulting from free elections, that would ensure an independent judiciary, 
and in which the basic liberties would be effectively protected. The reasons given are well-
known: first, economic and cultural backwardness (“the quality of our people is too low”, as 
Jiang Zemin used to say); and then, more ominously, the weight of “tradition”: while 
economic backwardness and a low level of education can be corrected with proper 
development policies, tradition is something more difficult to deal with, especially when, as in 
the Chinese case, it is understood as a sort of timeless essence.  
 
 Rather than the economic argument, which has been debated by specialists drawing widely 
different conclusions from the same statistical data, it was the cultural argument—the 
obstacles raised by the so-called Chinese tradition, essentialized as the “Confucian 
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tradition”—that made me, so to speak, intellectually cringe, and encouraged me to re-
examine the problem of tradition and democracy in China (if there indeed was a problem) on 
a sounder basis, that is, mostly, on a historical basis.  
 
Building a Repertoire of Historical Resources for Democracy 
 This has led me to attempt to draw up a repertoire of the historical resources (both notional 
and practical) available in the government and society of late imperial China that might 
possibly be put to use for any kind of democratic transition in China, if such a thing is to 
happen—or should I say, is to happen again, since elements of actual democracy have in fact 
existed and functioned in modern China from 1912 (and even a little earlier, at the local level), 
on and off, and that these first democratic experiences have not always been the total failure 
deplored by so many authors. 
 
 The notion of “historical resources” needs to be used with great care. It may be tempting to 
connect past experiences and future developments directly, to claim (as some Chinese 
intellectuals have done) that “we have always done that”. I do not think this makes much 
sense when speaking of democratic practices, not to speak of institutions, in the case of 
China—or of most cultures for that matter. What we are considering are, rather, practices and 
notions that functioned in a completely different context, but might be used for new purposes 
through a process of reinterpretation. The wonderfully efficient concept of “invention of 
tradition” applies rather well here; but in fact traditions do not always need to be “invented” 
wholesale, they can be simply reinterpreted—or reinvented. If the “resources” I will be 
talking about can be of any use today, it is as a result of this process of reinvention. 
 
 Besides the discourse I have mentioned, which sees only incompatibilities between the so-
called Chinese tradition and the development of a modern (that is, western) style of 
democracy, another sort of discourse claims the exact opposite; to wit, that the Chinese past—
no more no less than the past of the Western nations—offers strong elements of quasi 
democracy, which should be seen as an asset for future developments. This sort of claims 
originated, essentially, with the revolutionary generation that overthrew the Qing dynasty, and 
it can be found with its intellectual inheritors, up until today.  
 
 The elements of democracy (or quasi democracy) in question, which we might call “sprouts 
of democracy” (by analogy with the well-known “sprouts of capitalism” of the 1960s), make 
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up a rather short list, in fact. First are the notions found in the Book of Documents and in 
the Mencius regarding the primacy of the people over the sovereign (the so-called minben 
sixiang 民本思想), to which Mencius added what has been widely interpreted as a “right to 
rebel” against a ruler no longer up to the task, and later was even made into a “right to 
revolution”. In the first years of the twentieth century these notions were sometimes related to 
western constitutionalism inasmuch as they emphasized the illegitimacy or even impossibility 
of despotism in China. They entered into combinations with ideas borrowed from the West 
which they were able, as it were, to endow with new power in the Chinese context—a case of 
reinvention, one might say. But this of course is not the same thing as being notions akin to 
democracy or rights, which the theories of the primacy of the people and of the revocable 
status of the ruler are definitely not.  
 
 Another notion—or rather, institution—frequently mentioned as an example of a 
democratic element in the Chinese past is the examination system, extolled as an egalitarian 
method for recruiting talents in the service of the state. In his famous lectures of the early 
1950s, the historian Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895-1990) did not hesitate to compare the recruitment of 
bureaucrats through examinations with the election of parliamentary members in Western 
democracies. According to him, the problem was in both cases to select able administrators 
for the state in an impartial way; and, thanks to the wisdom and virtue acquired through their 
studies, the literati selected through examination were “representing” (daibiao) the entire 
population since they were able to express its ideas. The idea of recruiting the members of 
parliament through examinations may appear attractive to us, but it is not democracy. 
 
 A particularly glorious period for literati dominance of politics, if not always of 
government, was the second half of the Ming dynasty. As a matter of fact, late-Ming politics 
have been celebrated by more than one author as a sort of proto-democracy whose heroes 
were the members of the Donglin party, who fought bravely against the despotic excesses of 
the throne and of the eunuchs. A typical example of such views is Zhang Junmai 張君勱 
(better known in the West as Carsun Chang), a German-trained philosopher, who ended his 
book The Third Force in China (1952) with considerations on what he believed to be an 
ancient and profound inclination of China towards democracy. He too brandished Mencius, 
who, according to him, was “perhaps the most energetic advocate of democratic government 
in the ancient world” and was followed by “an unbroken line of thinkers who have espoused 
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the cause of the individual and of his inalienable rights”—“[up] to the scholars of the 
Ming dynasty”, he says, because, in the eyes of intellectuals of his generation and upbringing, 
the Manchu Qing dynasty could only be an age of darkness and despotism during which 
historical progress was, so to speak, stopped in its tracks. This interruption notwithstanding, 
Zhang Junmai claims in as many words that there existed a well-defined democratic tradition 
in China, “in theory as well as in practice”. And concerning the last he also says that, 
independently of the notion of “popular will” found in Chinese philosophy, in traditional 
Chinese society ordinary people actually enjoyed a large amount of individual liberty, for the 
simple reason that the government intervened very little in their lives. 
 
Two Opposite Discourses on China 
 This is something quite different from our notion of individual freedom, to be sure: we 
would rather call it “negative liberty”. In any case, Chang’s statement is interesting because it 
seems directly to echo the opinions of certain European observers who travelled and lived in 
China in the nineteenth century, some of them for substantial periods of time—people whose 
observations and claims are mostly left unmentioned by historians. While I was browsing, a 
few years ago, through the writings of a selection of such authors, I came more than once 
across a surprising statement: to wit, that China is, in some ways, a democratic country—and 
for some of these authors, in several respects it is actually more democratic than many places 
in Western Europe.  
 
 The works I am referring to are definitely a minority among the considerable mass of 
writings by “old China hands” published in the nineteenth century, which are rather 
characterized by their sinophobic attitude. Still, during the entire nineteenth century, both pre- 
and post-Opium wars, we find China experts who vehemently criticized the widespread view 
of China as a despotic empire inhabited by amorphous and submissive masses, and with no 
tradition worthy of the name to draw from in order to build a modern nation. But if this notion 
of a despotic China was indeed quite common, it seems that even the attitude of those who 
supported it changed noticeably as the imperial regime appeared more weakened and 
hopeless—as an impotent despotism, as it were. More and more observers tended to draw a 
sharp distinction between, on the one hand, an ailing system of government, and on the other 
hand, the formidable potential of the Chinese population—of the cheerfully industrious 
masses, as many said, who only needed a new sort of leadership (inspired by the Western 
example, of course) to be rescued from their backwardness and political submission. In other 
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words, even the sinophobic discourse, which could be quite strident indeed, admitted 
that there might be potential for change among the Chinese population. 
 
 A more positive sort of discourse could also be found, however—a discourse whose 
authors found in the actual workings of Chinese society (as opposed to the Chinese 
government) a level of self-government and freedom that encouraged several of them to use 
the term “democracy”. This term was obviously used in a loose sense, as these authors knew 
perfectly well that China had nothing like democratic political institutions even remotely 
comparable to those of England or France; but, again, the interesting thing is to examine what 
they meant exactly by this word, and what conclusions they drew. 
 
 Here I will quote two of them, who are rather different types but overlapped for some years 
in China during the 1840s: first, a famous French missionary, Father Évariste Huc, whose 
books are still popular; and second, a British consular official, Thomas Meadows, whose 
name is unknown today except to specialists, but who in my opinion is perhaps less fun, but 
certainly more interesting and, especially, more reliable than Huc as an observer of Chinese 
realities.  
 
 The high point in Father Huc’s career in China was his well-known odyssey, started in 
1845, to Western Mongolia and Tibet in the company of his superior, Father Gabet. They 
were arrested by the Manchu authorities in Lhasa and led back to the frontier under escort—
the “frontier” being, in this case, Macau, a very long way from Tibet. Huc’s voyage to Tibet 
and back to Macau produced two famous books, published in 1850 and 1854 respectively 
(and almost immediately translated into English), the Journey through Tartary and Thibet, 
and its sequel The Chinese Empire, which covers the trip back from Tibet to Guangdong and 
contains, in addition, a quantity of asides, explanations, observations and anecdotes on every 
aspect of Chinese life, including the materials I will mention. The problem with Huc is that 
what must be considered second-hand and what is attributable to himself, and, among the 
latter, what is about reliable, or obviously embellished, or simply invented, cannot be easily 
separated. Meadows, on the contrary, is as a typical example of British matter-of-factness and 
could not be farther from Huc’s Southern French bragging and exaggerations. During his long 
career in China—first in Canton, from 1843, and later in Shanghai throughout the 1860s—he 
published two books (Random Notes on the Government and People of China, and The 
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Chinese and their Rebellions) where he proves himself a keen, industrious and well-
organized observer, and has much of interest to say. 
 
 Huc, Meadows and a few others argue passionately against the notion of a despotic 
Chinese government; in particular, they claim that what we would call “civil society” enjoyed 
a high degree of autonomy, that there were individual liberties, a tradition of protest and 
opposition to the state, and even, according to some, that community institutions ensured a 
degree of basic democracy.  
 
A Culture of Protest 
 While some authors (Meadows notably) make much of the so-called “right to rebel”, more 
interesting is the frequent mention of what we might call a culture of popular protest which is 
largely confirmed by a quantity of Chinese sources. This especially took the form of posters 
denouncing or lampooning officials who incurred the displeasure of their constituents, or of 
meetings convened by public notice to submit grievances to the local magistrates. Here the 
locus classicus is Huc, who claims to have witnessed what he is speaking about, although I 
suspect he borrowed it from another author even though the style is undeniably his: 
“A very powerful organ of public opinion is the placard, and this is everywhere made use of 
with the dexterity of long practice. When it is desired to criticise a Government, to call a 
Mandarin to order, and show him that the people are discontented with him, the placards are 
lively, satirical, cutting, and full of sharp and witty sallies; the Roman pasquinade was not to be 
compared to them. They are posted in all the streets, and especially on the doors of the tribunal 
where the Mandarin lives who is to be held up to public malediction. Crowds assemble round 
them, they are read aloud in a declamatory tone, whilst a thousand comments, more pitiless and 
severe than the text, are poured forth on all sides, amid shouts of laughter.”1 
 
 Elsewhere in his book Huc has an anecdote which technically at least could be authentic—
although with him one never knows—in which the notables of a town somewhere in the 
Northwest reject the magistrate who has been appointed by the provincial governor and 
manage to take him back to the provincial capital without any violence (other than hostile 
shouting from the crowd) and to get a replacement more to their liking. Now, if the expression 
of grass-roots public opinion by posters and other sorts of demonstrations is frequently 
mentioned in Chinese sources, things were far from being always as peaceful as in such 
anecdotes. In my own reading of these sources, for example, I have come rather frequently 
upon examples of attacks of official headquarters by furious mobs, ending with the sacking of 
public offices and the flight of officials.  
                                                 
1 M. Huc, The Chinese Empire (London, 1855), vol. 2, pp. 74-75. 
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 Such occurrences are indeed mentioned by another foreign observer, who was in China 
much later than Huc, the well-known British diplomat and Sinologist, Herbert Allen Giles 
(1845-1935). Giles spent the 1880s and early 1890s in various Chinese cities as a consul, 
before becoming the first professor of Chinese at Cambridge University. In 1902 he gave a 
series of lectures at Columbia University, which were published the same year under the 
hardly original title China and the Chinese. In one of these he describes the same sort of 
popular resistance, but, interestingly, he emphasizes the fiscal aspects of it. Basing himself on 
examples found in the North China Herald and on events he alleges to have seen with his own 
eyes, he claims that the smallest increase in taxation has to be carefully negotiated with the 
leading merchants and with the village chiefs and elders, and that if a compromise is not 
reached, resistance sets in, first, passively, and then, if necessary, in the form of riots ending 
with the sacking of the magistrate’s offices.  
 
“Democratic China” and the “Practical Liberties” 
 Now the arresting detail is that in Giles’s book these anecdotes occur in a chapter entitled 
“Democratic China”, whose conclusion is that, if one can indeed say that the Chinese 
government is democratic, it is because the populace always finds a way to make the officials 
give in when it considers it has been unjustly dealt with (“always” is certainly a great 
exaggeration on the part of Giles, because in fact brutal repression was not rare). This concept 
of what we should probably call “negative democracy” may seem peculiar, especially on the 
part of a British citizen; except perhaps that the very notion that everything boils down to a 
struggle of the citizens against their government sounds quite Anglo-Saxon indeed. 
 
 Father Huc, we shall see, also speaks of democracy, and in fact in a technically more 
appropriate context. Before coming to this, however, let me quote another passage of his, 
where he says:  
“It is a great mistake to fancy the Chinese hemmed in by arbitrary laws, and quailing under a 
despotic power, which rules their actions and dictates all their proceedings. Though an absolute 
monarchy, moderated, indeed, by the influence of the educated classes, the people enjoy 
beneath it much more liberty than is generally supposed, and possess many privileges which we 
might vainly seek in some countries boasting a liberal constitution.”  
And among these liberties Huc mentions the freedom to travel and to trade, the freedom of 
association, and even the liberty of the press, which according to him is “another ancient 
institution of China, which we Europeans fancy to have invented.” 
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 Most of the nineteenth-century authors I have consulted extol these liberties which 
Meadows—perhaps their most enthusiastic commentator—calls “practical liberties”. 
Meadows claims that in real estate transactions the Chinese enjoy a degree of facility and 
security that compares most favorably to similar transactions in England; that they can travel 
as they wish, carry on the occupation they choose, leave the country and freely come back 
despite what he calls “obsolete regulations”; many villages never see an official from the 
government, except tax collectors once a year; so much so that, he says, “In all, Chinamen 
enjoy an amount of freedom in the disposal of their persons and property, which other 
European nations than the Russians may well envy them”.  
 
 Herbert Giles, for his part, proposes almost exactly the same list of practical liberties as 
Meadows and claims that “Every one who has lived in China, and has kept his eyes open, 
must have noticed what a large measure of personal freedom is enjoyed by even the meanest 
subject of the Son of Heaven”.  
 
 Despite a few exaggerations, and allowing for some wordplay, most of these claims are 
historically acceptable. What I call “wordplay” is in fact important. We know that freedom of 
the press and freedom of association, for example, are among the most basic liberties (or 
rights) guaranteed in any democratic regime, and we can suppose that the use of such terms 
by Huc and others was meant to enhance their point; but in their case the “associations” 
referred to are no more than the innumerable hui 會 that mushroomed in China—not 
infrequently to make up for failing state institutions, as Huc justly remarks—but were 
emphatically non political, and especially could not be secret or religious (a point also made 
by Giles). Likewise the “press” refers not to newspapers, which did not exist in China in 
Huc’s time, but to any other sort of print products, and here again Huc insists that “printing 
books likely to trouble public tranquility and defeat the respect due to authority” is liable to 
severe punishment. 
 
 In other words, the liberties discussed here are by no means political and remain, indeed, 
“practical”. As stressed by several of our authors, provided that the Chinese avoid breaking 
certain rules, they will be left alone by the government and free to do whatever they wish. But 
if for whatever reason, fiscal or otherwise, they are displeased with the local representatives 
of the government, they may very well attack them politically in the form of public protests, 
or even physically by resorting to violence. 
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Similarities with China today 
 Again, and in the most general terms, this pattern seems to me to reflect rather faithfully 
the realities of nineteenth-century China. It also bears a certain uncanny resemblance with the 
situation in present-day China: like today, we have many concrete (or practical) liberties for 
those who have the wherewithal to make use of them, but no freedom beyond certain limits 
very precisely laid down (like, being disrespectful of authority, or joining a secret society); 
and like today we can see a propensity to violent opposition directed at the local officials 
when the situation is considered unbearable, or beyond negotiation—the higher authorities 
being appealed to for arbitration. As a matter of fact, many of Meadows’ considerations on 
the well-organized autocracy of China can only remind us of the present.  
 
 Parallels with the present must always be made with much caution, of course, and they are 
only parallels. Still, we are brought back to the initial question: how and to what extent can 
we say that a culture of protest against local officials, a strong civil society as far as socio-
economic organizations are concerned, and an eagerness to make productive use of whatever 
liberties are acknowledged by the state—and I should add a level of popular literacy admired 
by every nineteenth-century commentator—constitute historically what I have called 
democratic resources? 
 
 For one thing, we seem to be very far from the so-called Chinese passivity, avoidance of 
conflict and blind respect for authority that were deplored by a quantity of other authors 
during this same nineteenth century, and not only then but also later (down to the diagnoses 
delivered by some political scientists today), not to speak of so many Chinese critics who 
have denounced time and again the “slave mentality” and submissiveness to authority of their 
fellow citizens. Or to put it otherwise, all of this seems to deny the necessity of what was 
more or less prescribed by a number of missionary and diplomat authors in the nineteenth 
century—and later by the same Chinese critics I mentioned, down to the authors of the Yellow 
River Elegy in the 1980s—namely, that the Chinese must abandon their culture, no less, if 
they want to get access to modernity and democracy some day. 
 
Were There Such Things as Local Elections in Nineteenth-Century China? 
 But to come back to the liberties, practical or otherwise, celebrated by Huc, Meadows and 
others, they do not add up to democracy, at least not in the sense we give to this term. And yet 
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one of the basic institutions of democracy—freely electing one’s representatives—has 
been described by several of our authors in the particular framework of the local communities. 
As Father Huc explains: 
The villages are collectively responsible to the Exchequer for the discharge of all fiscal 
impositions, and they have at their head a mayor called Sian-yue (Xiangyue), who is chosen by 
universal suffrage. 
 The communal organisation is perhaps nowhere else as perfect as in China; and these mayors 
are chosen by the people, without the mandarins presenting any candidates or seeking in any 
way to influence the votes. 
 Every man is both elector and eligible for this office; but it is usual to choose one of 
advanced age, who both by his character and his fortune occupies a high position in the village. 
We have known many of the Chinese mayors, and we can affirm that in general they are worthy 
of the suffrages with which they have been honored by their fellow-citizens. 
 
And later in the text Huc does not hesitate to speak of the “ancient and curious institutions [of 
China], based on literary qualification, by which it has been found possible to grant, in the 
communes, universal suffrage to three hundred millions of men, and to render every 
distinction accessible to all classes.” 
 
 This question of the Chinese commune (or township), of its so-called mayors, and of the 
way they were elected by their fellow-citizens, is important because a significant number of 
nineteenth-century authors discuss it, including some who are rather on the sinophobic side of 
the divide; and it is in general to find that it is one of the best things (or rare good things) in 
China. But there is much confusion of course. We have just seen that Huc is talking of the 
xiangyue 鄉約 (or dibao 地保), and his description of their responsibilities as intermediaries 
between the officials and people is basically correct. But concerning their mode of election, 
most authors are more realistic than Huc with his French-style universal suffrage. Meadows, 
for example, gives an excellent description of the urban dibao in the Canton area and of their 
duties. As he explains, they were chosen publicly at a meeting held on a day announced in 
advance, and after a call for candidates. But in fact things had already been arranged with the 
most influential notables, whom the candidates had to visit beforehand. In Meadows’ 
description, the duties and position of the dibao are essentially those of a local police chief 
chosen by the community (not unlike an American sheriff, perhaps): not necessarily 
incompetent, but always corrupt and maintaining shady connections with the underground—
which actually helps him to get results when the magistrate gets really impatient. In any case, 
we are rather far from Huc’s respectable mayors. 
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 Interestingly, Martin Yang, a well-known Chinese sociologist, published in 1945 a 
description of the same process in his native Shandong village. But while he essentially agrees 
with the descriptions of the nineteenth-century authors, Yang emphatically denies that such 
elections—and village life more generally—can be called “democratic” in any serious way. 
He is probably right, but still—and again—all sorts of very concrete elements are there, 
which could easily be re-mobilized in the framework of a more modern and truly competitive 
system for electing local leaders, as opposed to the vague consensus manipulated by the 
notables (possibly to everybody’s satisfaction) which seems to have been the rule in 
traditional villages. 
 
 And even more of a resource, of course, were the skills developed in a number of private 
bodies, notably the philanthropies, to elect their managers annually, resort to regular 
procedures of debate and vote and to the rule of majority, and ensure the transparency of 
accounts.  
 
The Ming constitutional order 
 Rather than developing on this, however, I would like to come back to one of the so-called 
“democratic precedents” (or “sprouts”) whose existence has sometimes been claimed by 
twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, namely, the role of the literati in late-Ming politics. In 
fact more than mere politics is involved: it is the notion of a sort of constitutional order that 
imposed itself upon the emperor and protected certain basic rights. 
 
 This takes us to a period quite earlier than the nineteenth century—to another dynasty, 
actually, and this is more than a detail, because the Ming were a national dynasty, whereas the 
Qing were a conquest regime. For the revolutionaries who overthrew them in 1911, and then 
for generations of Republican nationalists, the Manchu Qing were essentially a barbarian and 
reactionary regime which enslaved the Chinese people and deprived the Chinese elites of the 
moral and political leadership which the Ming literati had exerted so admirably. In contrast, 
for quite some time now the Qing regime, at least in its heyday, has been very popular with 
the Chinese communist authorities as a model of enlightened authoritarianism. 
 
 The following considerations also take us to a socio-political environment completely 
different from the “industrious masses” living in the villages and towns of China, which were 
described by our nineteenth-century European authors as a fountain of liberty and energy, and 
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even of grass-roots democracy. The main actors of the late Ming so-called democratic 
saga were scholars, especially those among them who passed the examinations and became 
officials. And as we shall see the literati had a certain place assigned to them in what I do not 
hesitate to call the constitutional order of the Ming dynasty—a place which is central in the 
debates and incidents I will discuss. 
 
 I use the term “constitutional order”, rather than “constitution”, because this would 
obviously be anachronistic. There was nothing in imperial China that might be considered as a 
coherent legal text, a basic law (a dafa 大法) imposing itself upon the holders of political 
power and to which one could refer to check the legal conformity of the government’s actions 
and of the laws. But I am convinced that it is possible, and indeed useful, to speak, at least 
analogically, of a “constitutional order”, especially but not exclusively under the Ming, 
inasmuch as the actions of the state, of its officials and even of the emperor could be, to a 
certain extent, legally controlled and challenged through a process of censure availing itself of 
certain authorities. And I should add that the problem is particularly interesting to study in the 
Ming because of the publicity and political exploitation that accompanied the censure of the 
actions or decisions of the government, and indeed of the emperor. 
 
 As I see it, this constitutional order derives from a composite ensemble of texts and notions. 
Even when they do no more than follow old precedents, they are considered to be specific to a 
particular dynastic regime; and at the same time, importantly, they are placed under the 
shadow of the ultimate authority, that is, the Classics, whose self-appointed interpreters were 
the literati. In this way, the literati where the functional equivalents of the guardians of a 
constitution—or rather, here, of the scriptures with which dynastic institutions were supposed 
to be in conformity. Significantly, they lost this exclusive authority early in the Qing; but in 
the Ming the conflicts I will mention show that the role of what we might call “literati power” 
in the entire constitutional pattern was indeed quite important. 
 
 The components of that pattern can be divided into three categories. First come the so-
called “ancestral institutions”—in other words, a variable combination of pronouncements, 
institutions, and regulations created by the dynastic founder, which it was considered 
impossible, or very difficult, to change, at least to change openly, without risking to be 
accused of a lack of filial piety. This, in the case of the Ming, would correspond among other 
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things to the Huang Ming zuxun 皇明祖訓 (Ancestral instructions of the August Ming), 
as well as certain institutions also created by the Hongwu emperor (r. 1368-1398), such as, 
most importantly, a structure of the central government characterized by the absence of the 
Prime Minister and Central Secretariat that had been inherited from the previous dynasties, 
after Hongwu had decided to abolish them in 1380. Then comes the “administrative 
constitution”, that is, the description of the administrative structure more or less embodied in 
the Huidian 會典 (Collected institutions). And finally, the body of penal and administrative 
law that controlled the activities of the bureaucracy and population: even though it was 
“living law” in the sense that it was being constantly revised and enlarged, it rested on a body 
of rules and statutes that were considered ancestral institutions, and so, unchangeable (the 
penal code of 1397 is a good example). Taken together, these three elements, as I see it, 
compose what was called the guoti 國體, which I suggest to gloss as “the ordered form of the 
state”, and which is not that far from the notion of a constitution. The “affairs of the state”, or 
guoshi 國是, were supposed to be decided in such a way as to be in conformity with the guoti. 
 
 The problem was that this was not always the case. There were several factors of 
constitutional tension in the Ming, all due to the fact that the dynastic founder had created a 
number of institutions which had to be gradually and quietly abandoned under his successors, 
or at least transformed, because they were no longer attuned to the socioeconomic realities of 
the empire. Such was in particular the case with the structure of the central government. Not 
long after the death of Hongwu, there emerged an institution that was not part of the 
constitutional order he had devised, namely, the Grand Secretariat (neige 內閣), supposed to 
assist the emperor, which by the sixteenth century had developed into a powerful cabinet 
whose head secretary was called by everybody “Prime Minister” (zaixiang 宰相), because this 
was exactly what he was. The constitutional tension created by this situation was the source of 
much conflict between the Grand Secretariat and the rest of the bureaucracy, and this was 
especially the case when, in this same sixteenth century, the bureaucracy came into conflicts 
with the emperors which had, one might argue, constitutional causes. 
 
 Without entering into details, it should be enough to recall that both the Jiajing (r. 1522-
1566) and Wanli (r. 1573-1620) emperors antagonized the bureaucracy—or part of it—by 
making decisions related to dynastic succession that appeared to be in contradiction with the 
instructions left by the dynastic founder. That these were important matters is suggested by 
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the very names which were given to the controversies in question: the “Great Ritual 
debate” (dali yi 大禮議) in the case of Jiajing (in the 1520s), and the controversy on the 
“foundation of the state” (guoben 國本) in the case of Wanli (in the 1580s and 1590s). In both 
cases the emperor, still a young man, frontally opposed the advice of the specialists of ritual 
who were brandishing the Huang Ming zuxun to support their position. Jiajing (who was only 
a cousin of his predecessor but wanted his father to be honored as the emperor he had not 
been) held his ground; on the other hand Wanli (who wanted to designate as heir apparent a 
son who was not entitled to it according to the rules) yielded in the end, but grudgingly, and 
he remained in constant conflict with his bureaucracy. And indeed, these conflicts extended 
well beyond a technical argument, however violent, between specialists. The entire 
bureaucracy was split; the Grand Secretariat—in theory the closest advisers to the emperor, 
but with a weak constitutional position—tried not to take sides, but it was attacked from 
everywhere.  
 
The Changing Political Atmosphere of the Late Ming Dynasty 
 The guoben controversy at the end of the sixteenth century had the most far-reaching 
political consequences. This was because the attacks against the behavior and decisions of 
Wanli emperor soon dealt with other problems than imperial succession. Some of Wanli’s 
highly controversial initiatives were the occasion for several officials to criticize him in 
sometimes incredibly harsh terms and to develop lengthy arguments to the effect that the 
emperor was in fact overstepping what they could very well have called his constitutional 
rights. Besides, these controversies were widely publicized through the official information 
bulletin that the Jesuit missionaries christened the Peking Gazette. As it happens, during much 
of the reign of Wanli the Gazette circulated everywhere in the empire documents (such as the 
attacks just mentioned) that it should never have published in the first place because they had 
not been explicitly authorized by the emperor. To be more specific, the habit of the Wanli 
emperor to “keep the memorials in the palace” (liuzhong 留中)—in other words, to refuse to 
respond to them and feed them back to the administrative machine, thus ensuring the 
continuity and transparency of government—was attacked by some officials, especially 
censors, as what we would have called a “constitutional breach”, in the sense that the emperor 
was preventing the smooth functioning of the institutions which had been handed down to 
him by his ancestors. For their part the censors who were controlling the circulation of the 
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Peking Gazette were guilty of another constitutional breach by allowing documents not 
explicitly approved by the emperor to be published in the Gazette.  
 
 I think we may speak of politics becoming an autonomous process from the late sixteenth 
century onwards, and right through the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644. The causes were the 
development of political factions among the bureaucracy, the openness and publicity just 
mentioned, and the conflicts triggered by a weak and capricious emperor. The aim of the 
factions, which in the early seventeenth century developed into quasi political parties, was to 
take hold of the strategic places that controlled the appointment of officials, notably at the 
time of the periodic reviews of capital and provincial officials, which in principle involved 
some consulting of what was called “public opinion” (yulun 輿論). These were moments 
when there was an opportunity for what we call in French “alternance” (a replacement of the 
party in government); and such occurrences gave rise to a truly extraordinary, indeed 
flamboyant style of adversarial politics in the capital and in the entire country—the very style 
of politics, in effect, that has made some later scholars claim that the late Ming were 
developing a kind of proto-democratic political life. 
 
 In reality, it was no more than bureaucratic infighting displayed in a public arena and using 
high-sounding arguments for public consumption. But certainly the display was quite close to 
the lowest manifestations of our own political life, what with personal attacks on one’s 
enemy’s competence and integrity, organized campaigns involving the simultaneous sending 
of dozens of memorials to the emperor to accuse a particular official or faction of the most 
terrible crimes, the spreading of false rumors, all of this in high-flown rhetoric and invoking 
the highest values and principles. The emperor usually did not bother to read the memorials, 
but they were circulated nationwide through the Peking Gazette, and that was of course the 
point.  
 
 Among the most self-glorious partisans were a group of Confucian fundamentalists, mainly 
based in the Lower Yangzi, who had been out of power (but still very influential) since the 
1590s, and who coalesced into the already mentioned Donglin party in the first years of the 
17th century and desperately tried to make their comeback at the government. They eventually 
succeeded in 1620, immediately after the death of Wanli, but not for very long because they 
ran afoul of the eunuch Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢, who managed to suppress them in a bloody 
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campaign of repression. Now, the point is that the Donglin and their sympathizers, who 
were among the most audacious in attacking the Wanli emperor in memorials which were of 
course addressed to him in person, raised certain issues with strong constitutional overtones.  
 
 Two themes might be mentioned here in particular. The first one is the right to 
communicate with the throne in the form of memorials, either to recommend policies or to 
denounce one’s political enemies (or both). In several instances, lower officials were 
sanctioned for having done just that, but their political friends managed to quote from the 
basic law of the dynasty, so to speak (i.e. the texts I mentioned earlier), to prove that they 
indeed had a right and even a duty to communicate with the emperor, and that the circulation 
of the “pure opinions expressed in the empire” (tianxia zhi qingyi 天下之清議) should by no 
means be hampered by “small men” (xiaoren 小人). 
 
 The second theme is the personal conduct of the emperor and the overstepping of his 
constitutional rights. I am referring in particular to the incredibly violent attacks that were 
motivated by Wanli’s infamous mining and fiscal policies in the years around 1600. The 
policies in question consisted in sending to the provinces palace eunuchs with large staffs and 
full powers to open silver mines wherever they wanted, and more generally to take control of 
commercial taxation—Wanli needed very large amounts of money for various purposes 
regarding the imperial palace and family. The result was turmoil everywhere, and loud 
protests from a great many officials throughout the empire. One of the most vocal ones was a 
rather colorful ally of the Donglin leaders, a certain Li Sancai 李三才, who appears to have 
been a particularly smart politician. In 1604, while he was governor of the Huai region, he 
became a star in the profession by resisting the eunuch sent by Wanli to open mines and levy 
taxes and driving him to suicide. But already in 1600 he had sent to the emperor several 
memorials where he accused him (in a well-balanced and forceful rhetoric) of misusing the 
position that had been entrusted to him by Heaven and the empire he had inherited from his 
ancestors. In essence, the point was that the emperor is not the owner of the empire and of its 
riches, and that by trying to monopolize them for his own egoistical purposes and driving his 
people to suffer hunger and wander in the wilderness, Wanli was in effect betraying his 
ancestors and behaving against his constitutional position; not to mention the fact that he was 
risking a rebellion. Of course, these memorials were to no avail, and we do not even know if 
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Wanli ever cared to read them. In a way, the emperor had gotten out of control, 
constitutionally or otherwise.  
 
 During these years, considerations on the Mencian theme of what I would call “twin 
sovereignty”—the ruler is the master of men (renzhu 人主), but the people are “the master of 
the master of men” (renzhu zhi zhu 人主之主)—were frequently put forward. A little later 
this concept, which meant that the people’s sovereignty is a given, whereas the ruler’s 
sovereignty is conditional, was famously developed by Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610-1695) in 
his Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待訪錄 (Waiting for the Dawn).  
 
 I mention Huang Zongxi, who in a way relayed the notions developed by certain late-Ming 
literati and politicians (like Li Sancai), because he himself has been used as a democratic 
resource. Huang’s rather incendiary pamphlet was composed in 1663, at the beginning of the 
Qing dynasty, and soon went underground. But it resurfaced at the very end of the nineteenth 
century, when the revolutionaries intent on overthrowing the Qing regime rediscovered the 
text and ensured it considerable circulation. And it was then that Huang Zongxi was 
celebrated, along with his literati predecessors of the Wanli era, as a herald of democracy in 
China. I do not think he can be called such; but the point is that through proper 
reinterpretation he, like so many other things in the Chinese past, could be enlisted for the 
sake of converting China to democracy. 
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